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1. Introduction
This paper shall be presented from the point of  view of  a EU judicial operator 
as the Author is a judge of  a Member State (Portugal) and presently a lecturer at the 
Portuguese Centre for Judicial Studies (hereinafter, “CEJ”), the school that aims at 
preparing its students for the functions of  national public prosecutor and judge. The 
Author lectures both Criminal Law and International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters at CEJ.
Interoperability is quite a new concept for judicial operators, but it is a very 
interesting concept especially for the field of  international police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters. After all, police and judicial cooperation presuppose 
two or more different legal systems working with one another, for example by 
exchanging information (e.g., identity data), gathering evidence (e.g., oral statements, 
documents, DNA samples, digital data, etc) or arresting a person, in a different country 
where the procedure, investigation or trial is ongoing.1
International cooperation in general is increasingly important today due to 
substantial increases in world mobility2 and interconnectivity.3 That need is even greater 
in the European Union where internal national borders practically do not exist. As 
Article 3(2) of  the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter, TEU) states: “The Union 
shall offer its citizens an area of  freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the 
free movement of  persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external 
border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of  crime”.
1 Interoperability may be defined as a characteristic of  a product or system, whose interfaces are 
completely understood, to work with other products or systems, at present or in the future, in 
either implementation or access, without any restrictions. While the term was initially defined for 
information technology or systems engineering services to allow for information exchange, a broader 
definition takes into account social, political, and organizational factors that impact system to system 
performance. The concept of  interoperability differs from neighbouring concepts like integration, 
compatibilization or portability. Integration happens when two or more functions or components 
of  the same system interact. Compatibility when two or more applications work in the same 
environment. Portability happens when an application can be transported from one environment to 
a different one without losing capabilities.
2 Human circulation today is increasingly intense, be it through migration or simply through tourism. 
According to a UN 2017 report on migration, “The number of  international migrants worldwide has continued 
to grow rapidly in recent years, reaching 258 million in 2017, up from 220 million in 2010 and 173 million in 2000. 
Over 60 per cent of  all international migrants live in Asia (80 million) or Europe (78 million). Northern America 
hosted the third largest number of  international migrants (58 million), followed by Africa (25 million), Latin America 
and the Caribbean (10 million) and Oceania (8 million).”. Albeit this significant inflow of  migrants to Europe, it 
should be noted that “In Europe, instead of  growing by two per cent, the size of  the population would have fallen by 
one per cent in the absence of  a net inflow of  migrants.”. Following the same report the main destinations of  
migration in Europe were  Germany - around 12 million -, and the UK – nearly 9 million (in https://
www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/
MigrationReport2017_Highlights.pdf). Where tourism is concerned Europe received 713 million 
tourists in 2018 while in 2000 it hosted 391 million tourists (in https://ourworldindata.org/tourism).
3 Cyberspace substantiated today in the Internet and the Wide World Web, as we all know, implies the 
deterritorialization of  many human activities including criminal activities. On recent trends in cyber-
dependent crime (crimes that may only be committed through information systems, for example 
ransomware infection) and cyber-related crime (crimes that are not unique to or require information 
systems, for example the distribution of  child pornography) see Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre 
(EC3) yearly reports in https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/internet-
organised-crime-threat-assessment. 
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To compensate for this absence of  internal (mutual) borders in the Schengen 
Area,4 the Schengen provisions abolish checks at the Union’s internal borders, while 
tightening controls at the external borders, in accordance with a single set of  rules. 
These rules cover several areas such as the existence of  a common set of  rules applying 
to people crossing the EU external borders, including types of  visa needed, conditions 
of  entry and how checks at external borders should be carried out; enhanced police 
cooperation (including rights of  cross-border surveillance and hot pursuit); stronger 
judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and transfer of  enforcement of  
criminal judgments.5 Also related to these problems, the EU foresees common policies 
on international protection (including asylum) and immigration.6
As we will see, to improve the application of  these common rules and policies, in 
recent years the EU has legally foreseen multiple information systems to be technically 
implemented in the near future on top of  updating the already existing information 
systems.7 In addition, the EU has very recently adopted a legal basis to make all these 
systems interoperable between themselves.
The present paper will focus on these recent developments of  interoperability in 
the EU of  particular relevance in the Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice, specifically 
Regulation 2019/817 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  20 May 2019 
on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU information systems in the 
field of  borders and visa and amending Regulations (EC) No 767/2008, (EU) 2016/399, 
(EU) 2017/2226, (EU) 2018/1240, (EU) 2018/1726 (hereinafter, “Regulation 2019/817) 
and (EU) 2018/1861 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council and Council 
Decisions 2004/512/EC and 2008/633/JHA (EU) and Regulation 2019/818 of  the 
European Parliament and of  the Council of  20 May 2019 on establishing a framework 
for interoperability between EU information systems in the field of  police and judicial 
cooperation, asylum and migration and amending Regulations (EU) 2018/1726, (EU) 
2018/1862 and (EU) 2019/816 (hereinafter “Regulation 2019/818”).
2. Interoperability: Regulations 2019/817 and 2019/818
On 14 May 2019, the Council adopted two regulations, Regulation 2019/817 
and Regulation 2019/818, establishing a framework for the interoperability between 
EU large scale information systems (databases) in the Area of  Freedom, Security, and 
4 The Schengen Area has its origins in 1985 “when cooperation between individual governments led to the signing, 
in Schengen (a small village in Luxembourg), of  the Agreement on the gradual abolition of  checks at common borders, 
followed by the signing in 1990 of  the Convention implementing that Agreement. The implementation of  the Schengen 
Agreements started in 1995, initially involving seven EU States. Born as an intergovernmental initiative, the developments 
brought about by the Schengen Agreements have now been incorporated into the body of  rules governing the EU. Today, 
the Schengen Area encompasses most EU States, except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United 
Kingdom. However, Bulgaria and Romania are currently in the process of  joining the Schengen Area. Of  non-EU States, 
Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein have joined the Schengen Area.” (in https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen_en). 
5 See article 77(2) of  TFEU and the Schengen acquis as referred to in Article 1(2) of  Council 
Decision 1999/435/EC of  20 May 1999 (in https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2000:239:FULL&from=EN).
6 Articles 78 and 79 of  TFEU
7 We use “information system” as meaning “a device or group of  inter-connected or related devices, one or more 
of  which, pursuant to a programme, automatically processes computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, 
retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of  devices for the purposes of  its or their operation, use, protection and 
maintenance” (article 2(a) of  Directive 2013/40/EU of  12 August 2013 on attacks against information 
systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA). 
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Justice. The new rules on interoperability, upon which the European Parliament agreed 
in April 2019, aim at providing easier information sharing and to “considerably improve 
security in the EU, allow for more efficient checks at external borders, improve detection of  multiple 
identities and help prevent and combat illegal migration[, terrorism and other serious crimes]. All this 
while safeguarding fundamental rights”.8
The two regulations are closely related and should be read together. It should be 
noted that the information systems and their foreseen interoperability, essentially aiming 
at the improved control of  external borders, will mainly affect third-country nationals.
The adoption of  two regulations instead of  one result from the need to respect the 
distinction between systems that concern:
a) the Schengen acquis regarding borders and visas (i.e. the VIS, the EES, the 
ETIAS and the SIS as regulated by Regulation (EC) nº 1987/2006),
b) the Schengen acquis on police cooperation or that are not related to the Schengen 
acquis (the Eurodac system, the European Criminal Records Information System 
for third-country nationals and the Schengen Information System as regulated by 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA).
The Regulations pursue the aim of  establishing interoperability between the 
following databases:
i. Three existing EU information systems: 
a) The Schengen Information System (hereinafter, “SIS”), that contains alerts 
about wanted or missing people and objects9. 
b) The Eurodac system that contains the identity, including fingerprints, of  
asylum applicants who have been registered in EU Member States and associated 
countries. This database serves the implementation of  the Dublin regulation 
that determines which EU Member State (hereinafter, “MS”) is responsible 
for the examination of  an application for asylum. It helps to: a) verify whether 
an applicant has previously claimed asylum in another Member State; b) check 
whether an applicant has previously been apprehended when entering European 
territory unlawfully; c) determine which Member State is responsible for 
examining an asylum application.10
c) The Visa Information System (hereinafter “VIS”), that is used to register 
and check persons applying for a visa to enter the Schengen area. Authorities 
can use the VIS to perform biometric matching to identify people and prevent 
identity theft or fraud.11
ii. Three EU information systems that are still in an implementation phase:
a) the Entry/Exit System (hereinafter, “EES”), that will register entry, exit and 
refusal of  entry information of  non-EU nationals crossing the external borders 
of  the Schengen area.12
8 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/05/14/interoperability-between-
eu-information-systems-council-adopts-regulations/. 
9 In the near future the SIS will be updated to include other kinds of  alerts and to expand its data types, 
including facial images and DNA profiles. For an overview consult https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/11/19/schengen-information-system-council-adopts-new-rules-to-
strengthen-security-in-the-eu/. For the legal basis see Regulations (EU) 2018/1860, (EU) 2018/1861 
and (EU) 2018/1862.
10 Regulation (EU) Nº 603/2013.
11 Regulation (EC) Nº 767/2008.
12 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226.
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b) the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (hereinafter, 
“ETIAS”), which allows and keeps track of  visitors from countries who do not 
need a visa to enter the Schengen Zone.13 
c) the European Criminal Records Information System for third-country 
nationals (hereinafter “ECRIS-TCN”);14
iii. the Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (hereinafter “SLTD”) 
database;
iv. parts of  Europol’s database.15
The interoperability between these (eight) systems will consist of  four components:
a) A European search portal (hereinafter “ESP”) to search simultaneously in 
all the EU information Europol and Interpol systems. As the regulations state 
in their Recitals: “the ESP should act as a single window or ‘message broker’ to search the 
various central systems and retrieve the necessary information seamlessly and in full respect of  
the access control and data protection requirements of  the underlying systems” (Recital 13).
b) A shared biometric matching service (hereinafter “BMS”) to search and 
cross-check biometric data in the EU information systems. As the regulations 
state: “the main purpose of  the shared BMS should be to facilitate the identification of  an 
individual who is registered in several databases, by using a single technological component to 
match that individual’s biometric data across different systems, instead of  several components. 
(…) The shared BMS should regroup and store all these biometric templates – logically separated 
according to the information system from which the data originated – in one single location, 
thereby facilitating cross-system comparisons using biometric templates and enabling economies of  
scale in developing and maintaining the EU central systems” (recital 18).
c) A common identity repository (hereinafter “CIR”) containing biographical 
and biometric data of  non-EU citizens available in several EU information 
systems. “The CIR should provide for a shared container for identity data, travel document 
data and biometric data of  persons registered in the EES, VIS, ETIAS, Eurodac and the 
ECRIS-TCN. It should be part of  the technical architecture of  these systems and serve as the 
shared component between them for storing and querying the identity data, travel document data 
and biometric data they process” (Recital 25).
d) A multiple identity detector (hereinafter “MID”) to detect multiple identities 
linked to the same set of  biometric data. “The MID should create and store links 
between data in the different EU information systems in order to detect multiple identities, with 
the dual purpose of  facilitating identity checks for bona fide travellers and combating identity 
fraud. The MID should only contain links between data on individuals present in more than 
one EU information system. The linked data should be strictly limited to the data necessary to 
verify that a person is recorded in a justified or unjustified manner under different identities in 
different systems, or to clarify that two persons having similar identity data may not be the same 
person” (Recital 39).
As we can easily infer from these brief  descriptions, when the information 
systems become fully interoperable, they will be a very powerful technical tool for the 
referred to purposes16. The technical aspects of  all these systems and interoperability 
13 Regulation (EU) 2018/1240.
14 Regulation (EU) 2019/816.
15 Including data on people suspect of  having committed crimes or for whom there is reasonable 
grounds to believe they will commit a criminal offense (see article 18(2)(a), (b) and (c) of  Regulation 
(EU) 2016/794 and articles 4(16) of  Regulations (EU) 2019/817 and 2019/818).
16 The concrete date for the interoperability is not stated in the regulations and depends on technical 
factors mainly of  the responsibility of  eu-LISA.
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components are to be managed by a sole entity, the European Union Agency for the 
Operational Management of  Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of  Freedom, Security 
and Justice (hereinafter “eu-LISA”).17
3. Some common problems
When we speak of  the improved detection of  multiple identities and the 
prevention and combat of  illegal migration, terrorism and other serious crimes, we 
presuppose that the available data is trustworthy, that it fully corresponds to reality. 
Obviously all systems, be them in digital form or in other mediums (for example, paper 
archives) bring with them risks of  error caused by mere accident or by an intentional 
behaviour on the part of  certain types of  persons. Sometimes it is difficult to correct 
these mistakes or at least it takes time. As a criminal judge, the author has encountered 
mistakes made by court clerks while inserting names, ages, addresses, types of  crimes 
committed, etc., in criminal records. The author also encountered multiple identities of  
convicted people in criminal records, including ones that are only detected or corrected 
years after their inclusion in the official records.18 These risks are further enhanced by 
the large-scale information systems here concerned (in part used to detect multiple 
identities), that evidently imply a very high level of  mutual trust between MS, national 
authorities and agencies involved in the inputting, updating and accessing of  data.
On the other hand when we talk about safeguarding fundamental rights, considering 
that the interoperability components, especially the shared BMS automatically 
processing and granting access to sensitive personal data19 such as fingerprint data 
or facial images, that is connected to biographical data (name, nationality, residence, 
etc) and other important data like criminal records, we have to take into account, 
in particular, the fundamental rights foreseen in Articles 7 and 8 of  the Charter of  
Fundamental Rights of  the EU (CFREU), the right of  respect for private and family 
life and the right to protection of  personal data.
Due to the nature of  the data, especially biometric data, and the aimed 
interoperability of  these large scale databases, as the Cambridge Analytica scandal 
and today’s ever more frequent data breaches teach us (with the subsequent illegal 
use or acquisition of  data), internal and external security is obviously of  the utmost 
importance. Cyberattacks, for example in the form of  distributed denial of  services 
(DDOS) or ransomware, are also very real and big problems in this domain.
The Regulations try to address these problems in technical terms, for example, 
by foreseeing specific profiles of  the people that may access the systems, by explicitly 
17 For an overview of  eu-LISA consult https://www.eulisa.europa.eu/About-Us/Who-We-Are. 
18 For example, it is not unusual for courts to convict a certain person as the author of  various 
criminal offences judged in different and separate casefiles to only later, for example, while executing 
a custodial sentence, discover that in each of  them he was using a different identity based on forged 
documents. These identities sometimes include, apart from different names and parents, different 
nationalities. 
19 ‘Personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person 
(‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an 
online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of  that natural person (article 4(1) of  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
(GDPR)); ´ biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to 
the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of  a natural person, which allow or confirm 
the unique identification of  that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data (article 
4(14) of  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR)).
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keeping logs of  accesses, by tightening transfers of  data to third parties and conceding 
specific rights to the data subjects like the right of  access, rectification and erasure of  
personal data stored in the MID. All of  this while foreseeing important supervisory 
powers by independent entities including the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(hereinafter “EDPS”).
But, as the EDPS pointed out before the final versions of  the regulations were 
approved: “Interoperability is not primarily a technical choice, it is in particular a political choice to 
be made. Against the backdrop of  the clear trend to mix distinct EU law and policy objectives (i.e. 
border checks, asylum and immigration, police cooperation and now also judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters) as well as granting law enforcement routine access to non-law enforcement databases, the 
decision of  the EU legislator to make large-scale IT systems interoperable [will] not only permanently 
and profoundly affect their structure and their way of  operating, but [will] also change the way legal 
principles have been interpreted in this area so far and [will] as such mark a ‘point of  no return’”.20
In addition to all this and where judicial cooperation in criminal matters is 
concerned, it should be noted that the latest developments in the CJEU case-law are 
not very indicative, to say the least, of  a general environment of  mutual trust between 
MS. 
For example, through a judgement issued on the 27 of  May 2019,  in joint 
cases C-508/18 and C-82/19 PPU, concerning a preliminary ruling requested by the 
Supreme Court of  Ireland, the CJEU ruled that public prosecutors offices of  a MS, in 
the concrete case Germany’s, cannot be considered “judicial authorities” for the effect 
of  issuing an European Arrest Warrant, if  they: “are exposed to the risk of  being subject, 
directly or indirectly, to directions or instructions in a specific case from the executive, such as a Minister 
for Justice, in connection with the adoption of  a decision to issue a European arrest warrant”.
Furthermore, through a judgement issued on the 25 of  July 2019, in case 
C-216/18, concerning a preliminary ruling requested by the High Court of  Ireland, the 
CJEU ruled that where the executing judicial authority, called upon to decide whether a 
person in respect of  whom a European arrest warrant has been issued for the purposes 
of  conducting a criminal prosecution, is to be surrendered, has material indicating 
that there is a real risk of  breach of  the fundamental right to a fair trial on account 
of  systemic or generalised deficiencies concerning the independence of  the issuing 
Member State’s judiciary. In the concrete case Poland, that authority must determine, 
specifically and precisely, whether there are substantial grounds for believing that that 
person will run such a risk if  he is surrendered to that State.
This last decision involving Poland’s institutions has, as a backdrop, introduced 
recent changes to the constitutional role of  the National Council for the Judiciary 
in safeguarding independence of  the judiciary, in combination with the Polish 
Government’s invalid appointments to the Trybunał Konstytucyjny (Constitutional 
Tribunal) and its refusal to publish certain judgments, and other legislative initiatives 
that clearly affect the independence of  the polish judiciary, like the compulsory 
retirement of  some of  their Supreme Court judges. These legislative measures with 
the clear weakening of  the sacred (European) principle of  separation of  powers, thus 
affecting the essence of  the fundamental right to a fair trial, were all critically analysed 
in the Commission’s reasoned proposal of  20 December 2017, submitted for a Council 
Decision on the determination of  a clear risk of  a serious breach by the Republic of  
Poland of  the rule of  law, in accordance with Article 7(1) of  the TEU.
20 GDPS, in Opinion 4/2018 on the Proposals for two Regulations establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU large-scale information systems.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2019
135 Alexandre Au-Yong Oliveira
What these recent cases reflect, in the author’s opinion, is that the principle 
of  mutual recognition and the underlying mutual trust that are supposed to be the 
cornerstones of  the system of  judicial cooperation in criminal matters between MS21 
are not to be taken for granted and are, at the moment, far from being axioms that 
every MS can blindly accept.22 What these cases illustrate is that mutual trust is not 
something that derives from a mere nominal categorization acquired by becoming a 
MS, but presupposes national institutional backgrounds that in some cases, even in the 
EU, are still quite distant from each other and/or that can quickly change and ground 
legitimate suspicions on key democratic values like judicial independence.
So if  we transpose these problematizing ideas to the interoperability here in 
question, that, as mentioned, presupposes a high level of  mutual trust between MS, 
we may find even more difficulties than those present in judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, for the input and access to those interoperable information systems 
will be done mainly through governmental agencies like Ministries of  Foreign Affairs 
where visas and asylum requests are concerned, or by law enforcement agents for the 
prevention and/or investigation of  illegal immigration and serious criminal offences. 
Obviously, the author is not questioning the need for this interoperability in 
today’s digital day and age, but, as the EDPS and other authors have pointed out,23 
the interoperability in question, involving so many states and agencies and large-scale 
databases, is not merely a technical decision but also a political one, with many (political 
and juridical) implications for the near future.
21 The principle of  mutual recognition is now stated in article 67(3) of  the TEU and article 82 of  
the TFEU. It was at Tampere (Italy) that the European Council - the EU summit of  the leaders 
of  its 15 member states - met in a special session in October 1999 to give a kick-start to the EU’s 
justice and home affairs (JHA) policies, establishing mutual recognition, based on mutual trust, as the 
cornerstone of  EU judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
22 As was stated not too long ago by the CJEU, “the principle of  mutual trust between the Member 
States is of  fundamental importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders 
to be created and maintained. That principle requires, particularly with regard to the area of  freedom, 
security and justice, each of  those States, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other 
Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised 
by EU law” (in Opinion 2/13 of  the Court, of  18 December 2014, paragraph 191, in https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A62013CV0002).
23 For concrete examples of  problems that arise in terms of  the trustworthiness of  the information 
systems in question see Evelien Brouwer, “Interoperability of  Databases and Interstate Trust: a 
Perilous Combination for Fundamental Rights” (in https://verfassungsblog.de/interoperability-of-
databases-and-interstate-trust-a-perilous-combination-for-fundamental-rights/). 
